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South Africa’s «Quiet Diplomacy»
and the crisis in Zimbabwe 
África do Sul «Diplomacia silenciosa» e a crise no Zimbábue
La « diplomatie discrète » de l'Afrique du Sud et la crise au Zimbabwe
Chris Alden
«(T)he ZANU-PF leadership has not been entirely
honest in its dealings with the ANC government»1.
«What I know is that we cannot afford the
complete collapse of Zimbabwe on our borders, so
we have to try and do whatever we can»2.
1 South Africa's  policy  of  constructive engagement,  or  «quiet  diplomacy»,  towards  the
crisis in Zimbabwe has been a source of domestic concern, international scepticism and
eventually outspoken criticism. The mounting economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe,
exacerbated by the costly intervention in the Congo and economic mismanagement of its
autocratically-inclined  president  provided  an  opportunity  for  South  Africa  to  give
substance to its stated democratic aspirations for the continent. Believing that it held
sufficient  leverage  over  Zimbabwe,  South  Africa  sought  to  mobilise  diplomacy  and
economic instruments to bring about a resolution to the crisis through the application of
«quiet diplomacy». Combining public reassurances for Robert Mugabe and support for
the land issue while exerting limited diplomatic and economic pressure and incentives,
the South African government hoped to bring about a peaceful  settlement.  However,
while South African president, Thabo Mbeki, issued assurances to an increasingly violent-
prone regime in Harare, South Africa's own credibility as a bastion of support for human
rights  values  was  increasingly  called  into  question and the  rand came under  severe
pressure, exacting a high toll on its own economy.
2 For observers of  this  phenomenon,  the most puzzling aspect  is  the behaviour of  the
continent's most celebrated democracy, South Africa. At the same time that Mbeki was
articulating  a  vision  for  Africa's  revival  couched  in  terms  that  marries  pan-African
idealism to neo-liberal tenets, Pretoria was pursuing an apparently inchoate approach to
the  economic  and  political  crisis  in  neighbouring  Zimbabwe.  With  international
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expectations running high that the South African would play a key role in resolving the
crisis, the apparent failure of «quiet diplomacy» to stem Zimbabwe's slide into economic
and political  chaos  calls  into  question  many  key  assumptions  held  of  South  African
foreign policy. What, one may ask, happened to the promise of enlightened South African
leadership of the region? Or, for that matter its converse, the latent fear of South African
hegemony over the region?
3 This paper seeks to understand the South African government's response towards the
crisis  in  Zimbabwe.  It  will  investigate  South  Africa's  «quiet  diplomacy»  towards
Zimbabwe in crisis through, first, a brief theoretical discussion; secondly an equally brief
historical  study of  South African-Zimbabwean relations;  thirdly an overview of South
Africa's  post-apartheid foreign policy  towards  SADC;  fourthly,  an examination of  the
Zimbabwean crisis and South Africa's attempts to resolve it; and, finally, an analysis of
the failings of Pretoria's approach.
 
A theoretical detour
4 The popularly held assumption that post-apartheid South Africa, by dint of its economic
weight in the Southern African region (with over 70 per cent of SADC's gross domestic
product), its military capacity (with a battle-tested conventional force and a competitive
arms manufacturing industry) and its political authority (based upon the peaceful nature
of the negotiated transition and the moral authority of Nelson Mandela), would dominate
continental  Africa.  According  to  Patrick  McGowan  and  Fred  Obeng,  whose  ground-
breaking study on the role of South African business on the continent framed the issues
in terms of «partner or hegemon», South Africa was poised between playing a role that
sought to overwhelm the region with its economic power and one with more benevolent
intent as an engine for regional development. Ian Taylor and Philip Nel have examined
post-apartheid foreign policy and seen the move towards embracing multilateralism as a
key instrument for South African diplomacy to be one that tied the new black elite to a
wider neo-liberal project.
5 The former perspective  finds  its  mooring in  the theoretical  literature on hegemonic
stability that suggests that international systems are ordered and organised through the
actions of a dominant state. The hegemon — which is able to wield superior economic,
political and even military resources — typically uses its position and resources to re-
write the rules that govern the system so as to sustain its own status3. In so doing, it
becomes the anchor of a sustainable system that offers stability to other states within it.
The  latter  perspective  builds  upon  a  self-described  neo-Gramscian  analysis  of  the
structure of the international system that places the emergent black elite within the
context of a transnational elite and the South African state as subordinate to the whims
of international capital. In effect, Taylor and Nel are providing an international relations
version of Hein Marais's work on the post-apartheid state and the limits to change. Both
analyses share the view, one encouraged by South Africans themselves, that in the post-
apartheid era Pretoria would assume a role commensurate with its potential capacity
and, acting through formal (SADC) and informal (business) regional arrangements, use its
substantive means to re-order regional relations to its advantage. For Taylor and Nel, this
has meant that South Africa has adapted itself to neo-liberalism and has in the process
forsworn the liberation project and any independence of action that falls outside the
attending prescriptions.
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South African-Zimbabwean relations in historical
perspective
6 While a cursory reading of South African-Zimbabwean relations sees much that binds the
two states together, a deeper historical analysis underscores the differences, animosities
and even outright rivalries. During the early colonial period South Africa's ambitions to
play a dominant role in the sub-region as articulated by the liberal Afrikaner Jan Smuts
were  manifestly  thwarted  by  the  Rhodesian  settler  community  in  the  1920s  with
Rhodesia's move to self-governance as opposed to closer amalgamation with the Union of
South Africa4. During the period of Unilateral Declaration of Independence, the mutual
distrust with which the Smith regime and the National Party (echoing the Anglo-Boer
conflict) held towards one another that it played out into ambivalent co-operation and,
ultimately, paved the way for Vorster's decision to force the pace of negotiations between
Smith and Zimbabwe's liberation forces in a mistaken belief he could earn kudos with
other African leaders (and guarantee non-interference with apartheid at home)5.
7 This ambivalence between the two white settler governments had its equivalent in the
relationship between the countries'  liberation movements.  Zanu (Zimbabwean African
National  Union)  and  Zapu  (Zimbabwean  African  People's  Union),  the  two  principal
liberation movements were aligned with Chinese and Soviet support respectively and,
following the pattern of the Cold War, South Africa's Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and
the  African  National  Congress  (ANC)  paired  up  with  their  ideological  comrades6.
Furthermore, given Rhodesia's proximity to liberated Africa, the Zimbabwean liberation
movements were accorded significantly more resources, developed a stronger politico-
military  organisation  and  fought  a  bitter  insurgency  that  was  to  eclipse  anything
experienced by the South African movements.
8 Zimbabwe's independence in 1980 did not,  as  some would have expected,  usher in a
period of co-operation between Robert Mugabe's Zanu and the primary South African
liberation movement, the ANC. On the contrary, the Lancaster House process - which has
provided for a decade of permanent white minority representation in parliament,  an
independent judiciary, constitutional guarantees on property rights and a commitment
on the part of Britain and the United States to finance land reform - that foreswore many
of the aims of the revolutionary era. In the economic sphere, the new government in
Harare sought to protect South Africa's dominant position in the economy as well as that
of  the white  commercial  farming sector  and,  for  its  own part,  Pretoria  renewed the
strategically important preferential trade agreement of 1964. Politically, while allowing
for the establishment of an office in the capitol, the Mugabe government did not let the
ANC to use Zimbabwe as a staging area for guerrilla infiltration into South Africa. The
South African military's  destabilisation campaign launched in the early  1980s,  which
provided for a time support for «super-ZAPU» dissidents as well  as moves to disrupt
transport within the country, served as a warning which Mugabe heeded against more
significant  support.  At  the  same  time,  as  the  liberated  region's  largest  economy,
Zimbabwe was able to take the leading role in the creation of the Southern African Co-
ordination  Conference  (SADCC),  a  regional  grouping  whose  explicit  purpose  was  to
progressively detach their economies from the dependent relationship upon South Africa.
This leadership in regional matters was reflected internationally as Zimbabwe came to
host the Non Aligned Movement summit in 1986 and the Commonwealth in 1990.
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9 The onset of the transition to democracy in South Africa, a process that began with the
release of Nelson Mandela in 1990, and continued through the extended constitutional
negotiations that ultimately culminated in democratic elections in 1994, served to cast a
further shadow over the relationship. FW de Klerk's decision to unilaterally abrogate the
preferential trade agreement in 1992 at the same time that Zimbabwe was undergoing a
painful structural adjustment programme sowed additional economic disruption in an
increasingly troubled domestic situation. The textile industry, where Zimbabwe had a
comparative advantage, was particularly hard hit with duties raised to 70 per cent and
attendant job losses of over 13,000 workers. At the same time, the debate over South
Africa's  relationship  to  the  various  competing  regional  economic  institutions-SADCC,
SACU and COMESA-sparked discussion as to the efficacy of SADCC and, once the ANC
elected  to  join  the  newly  formed  Southern  African  Development  Community  (SADC)
underscored for all South Africa's dominant economic position within the region. This
situation was replicated with respect to the Front Line States (FLS), a diplomatic/military
instrument that had been dominated by Mugabe in recent years and whose efficacy was
suddenly called into question in the aftermath of the achievement of its historical task.
Finally, the international acclaim heaped upon Mandela effectively side-lined Mugabe as
a regional leader and contributed to the animosities that surrounded the Zimbabwean
leader's efforts to maintain control over the newly formed SADC security apparatus (see
below).
 
South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy towards
SADC
10 The «leitmotif» of foreign policy issues involving Africa during the Mandela period —
General  Abacha's human rights violations in Nigeria,  Mozambique's nearly scuppered
elections and the civil war in Angola — reflected the idealism of the newly democratic
state on a continent in transformation7. Concern for human rights, democratisation and
peaceful resolution of conflict drove the public stances taken by South African officials
and appeared to many observers to signal the fulfilment of the promise of a distinctively
normative-based  post-apartheid  foreign  policy.  The  principal  theme of  the  incoming
Mbeki  administration,  the  pursuit  of  a  vision  of  an  economically  prosperous  and
politically independent continent led implicitly (and increasingly explicitly)  by South
Africa, was already forming part of the foreign policy discourse before he took office.
Coming into prominence in the aftermath of the ousting of Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko in
1997, this «African renaissance» (as Mbeki coined it) was predicated upon the resolution
of conflict; adherence to a development regime based upon neo-liberal tenets of open
markets and free trade; and the practice of «good governance» through the promotion of
human rights and democratisation8. At a more profound level, the notion of an African
renaissance was an attempt to reconstruct South Africa's fractured identity in terms that
reclaimed its African heritage while concurrently asserting a positive rationale for its
engagement in continental affairs. Mbeki's unveiling of the Millennium Africa Plan at the
Davos meeting in early 2001 and its reconfiguration as the New Economic Programme for
African Development (NEPAD) a year later is a further expression of this effort to provide
the blueprint for constructing the continental revival.
11 Notably, whereas human rights took centre stage during the Mandela era, following the
diplomatic fiasco surrounding South Africa's lone stance on the isolation of  Abacha's
South Africa’s «Quiet Diplomacy» and the crisis in Zimbabwe
Cadernos de Estudos Africanos, 2 | 2002
4
Nigeria,  the  government  increasingly  subsumed  human  rights  and  democratisation
concerns within a multilateral setting while pursuing «quiet diplomacy» with violators on
a bilateral basis9. The operational difficulties of giving substance to ethical considerations
was  paralleled  by  a  reconsideration  of  the  means  of  integrating  pressing  domestic
developmental concerns against a torrent of globalisation and continuing conflict on the
continent. This process culminated in the Department of Foreign Affairs' strategic review
in early 1999 that sought to incorporate the government's neo-liberal economic policies
(embodied in the Growth, Employment and Redistribution programme) alongside more
traditional security concerns into the foreign policy framework. Coined «wealth creation
and security»,  the  new approach effectively  completed the  shifting  of  South African
foreign  policy  away  from its  explicit  human rights  orientation  to  one  which  placed
developmental concerns at its heart10.
12 It  was in the SADC setting that the bulk of  South Africa's diplomatic resources were
focused. In the area of regional trade, the signing of the Maseru Protocol in 1996 put in
motion a process that would ultimately establish a free trade area across the region,
aimed  both  at  building  upon  and  rectifying  the  existing  foundation  for  economic
integration already implied by the legacy of the colonial infrastructure. Concurrently, the
rapid  expansion  of  South  African  corporate  interests  across  the  region,  from South
African Breweries to Standard Bank, anticipated the formal move to integrate Southern
Africa's economies. The Maputo Corridor, a public-private partnership centred on the
transport link between Johannesburg and Maputo (port city and capital of neighbouring
Mozambique)  attracted  millions  of  dollars  in  investment,  was  indicative  of  the new
approach that coupled the promise of local prosperity to the imperative of South African
economic  hegemony11.  In  the  area  of  regional  security,  the  re-ignition of  conflict  in
Laurent Kabila's newly established Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in August
1998 saw armed African intervention on an unprecedented scale and divided the SADC
between participants  — Angola,  Namibia  and Zimbabwe — and those states  — South
Africa, Botswana and Mozambique — seeking a negotiated solution to the conflict. With
Kabila providing the supporting states and leaders with substantial concessions to its vast
mineral resources and Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda acting on behalf of their domestic
security concerns, the stage was set for an internal «scramble» pitting brother against
brother on a scale which Africa had not experienced before12.  Exacerbating the divide
within SADC was the controversial South African and Botswanan military intervention in
Lesotho in September 1998 to uphold democratic elections. In both cases, Zimbabwe and
South Africa attempted to use the regional grouping through recourse to its security
institutions to prop up their larger foreign policy objectives and in the process put the
organisation's security apparatus into a condition of paralysis.
13 The construction and promulgation of a post-apartheid South African foreign policy, a
process  complicated  by  the  need  to  reconcile  competing  ANC  and  National  party
bureaucratic  interests,  has  experienced  its  greatest  challenge  in  the  imperative  to
manage conflict in the Southern African region. The on-going civil war in Angola, the
internationalisation of the war in Congo and the mounting economic and political crisis
in Zimbabwe threaten the integrity of these states as well as regional stability and with
that, the very prospects of development. Against the background of these tumultuous
events,  the guiding principles of South African policy under Mbeki towards the crisis
within SADC have centred upon three basic concerns: to keep SADC united; to work to
resolve institutional problems within SADC within the organisation's framework; and,
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14 SADC's central position in South Africa’s post-apartheid economic and political strategy
precludes  it from  acting  in  any  way  that  would  undermine  the  cohesion  of  the
organisation. It bears repeating that the original impetus for SADC in 1992 was that of a
vehicle for developmental regionalism and that was reflected in the fact that summit
meetings were the responsibility of ministers of trade and finance of member states (as
opposed to traditional regional projects, which are usually the creature of their foreign
ministries).  Indeed,  a  strategic review of  the organisation completed in 1997 did not
mention the need for the creation of a security sector but rather focused on structural
issues related to development13. While the security apparatus may have been paralysed
due to internal dispute and in a condition of suspension (see below), the all-important
trade, transport and finance sectors continued to function and consume the bulk of the
organisation's time and resources. South Africa places great stock in the organisation's
commitment to sign on to and activate the 1996 Maseru Trade Protocol, which opens the
region to cross border exchange and is believed will set in motion greater development
and conditions for regional integration, and does not want to jeopardise the realisation of
these larger aims.
15 Mandela's perchance for unilateralism on questions of principle or urgency — seen in the
SADC context in his apparent threat to withdrawal from SADC in 1997 or in the launching
of  bilateral  negotiations  with  Mobutu  Sese  Seko  that  same  year  —  has  arguably
contributed  to  inter-organisational  dissent14.  Since  1999,  this  approach  has  been
overtaken by Mbeki's conciliatory tone that emphasises quiet diplomacy and consensus
building between SADC member states. A contributing factor to this tack, ironically, could
be the tradition of post-independence African leaders offering solidarity to one another
— though Mbeki himself has spoken out against this in the wider OAU setting — which
remains a cardinal principle of African inter-state relations.
 
Work to resolve institutional problems within SADC
16 Even before the dramatic split within SADC in August 1998, which saw Mugabe use his
position as head of the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security to mobilise support for
tri-state intervention in the name of SADC, there were tensions within the organisation
around security, leadership, democracy and intervention in internal affairs. In the area of
security, the question of relationship between the Organ, the Inter-State Defence and
Security Committee (ISDSC) and the SADC chairman bedevilled several efforts to resolve
the dispute since the muting of  a  desire  to formally  establish a  security sector.  The
attempt to create an Association of Southern African States in 1995, which proposed to
incorporate  the  now  defunct  Front  Line  States  as  a  separate  entity  from  the  SADC
Secretariat under the auspices of the heads of state and government, floundered exactly
on this point of authority and autonomy15. The establishment of the Organ for Politics,
Defence and Security in January 1996 was done to «allow more flexibility and timely response,
at  the  highest  level,  to  sensitive  and  potentially  explosive  situations»  and  a  later  summit
meeting in June elaborated upon its structure by tasking it with sixteen very specific roles
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16. The apparent ambiguity which was midwife to its creation and the subsequent effort to
give specific content to its role was to become part of the on-going dispute over the
nature and responsibilities of  the Organ.  However,  this became especially acute after
Mugabe authorised SADC intervention in the Congo at a meeting of defence ministers on
18 August 1998 (despite the fact that the Organ had been suspended in Blantyre in 1997),
causing Mandela to convene an extra-ordinary SADC summit on 23 August 1998 to re-
examine this decision. The South African position on the validity of SADC intervention
under the auspices of the Organ was that it could only take place in terms that conform to
Chapter VllI of the United Nations Charter, and therefore accede to the internationally
recognised criteria for a regional security organisation and have the proper international
authorisation.  From this  perspective,  the  Organ was not  constituted  as  a  recognised
freestanding regional entity but derives its position from its relationship under SADC17.
Zimbabwean officials took the view that the Organ, like its predecessor the Front Line
States, was a largely informal grouping of senior officials chaired by a troika of heads of
state that operates alongside — but not under-SADC and therefore has a right to authorise
intervention18.  Indeed,  the  joint  South  African-Botswanan  intervention  into  Lesotho,
coming on the heels of the Zimbabwean led intervention in the Congo, while claimed by
Pretoria to have taken place under SADC auspices, was arguably on even shakier ground
than Mugabe's action.
17 This dispute overlapped with broader concerns of regional leadership, especially on the
part of Mugabe and his suddenly diminished international status with the ascension of
Mandela, and complicated by a desire to find a successor role for the Front Line States
mechanism within the framework of SADC. Furthermore, the commitment to democracy
and human rights — a feature of the SADC Treaty of 1992 — implies that there is a role for
some form of interference in the domestic affairs of SADC member states that violate
these conditions. Indeed, SADC actions supporting the Mozambican elections of 1994 and
the Lesotho constitution crises in 1998 were conducted in the name of these values and
have recently been reaffirmed by the foreign minister. That being said, it is clear that —
beyond the structural disputation and the debate over lines of authority — there remains
an unresolved conflict  within SADC over  the statutory commitment  to  promotion of
democratisation  and  human  rights  and  the  maintenance  of  established  norms  of
sovereignty. Even the restructuring of SADC in 2001, which consolidated the sectorally-
based approach (left over from the era of «delinkage» from apartheid South Africa) into
four distinctive areas, has yet to operationalize these codified principles in the day to day
workings of the newly established committee19.
 
Where necessary, use other multilateral instruments to pursue its
conflict resolution strategy
18 The South Africa government's commitment to pursue a multilateral approach towards
foreign policy provides it  with alternative avenues of  action to that  of  the SADC.  In
particular, the OAU with its officially sanctioned regional initiatives such as the Arusha
talks over Burundi,  the United Nations with its various initiatives on Angola and the
Congo, the Commonwealth on the Zimbabwe crisis, provide settings to give expression to
South African foreign policy objectives.  Thus where SADC as  an institution has been
unable to muster a strongly articulated position on a conflict due to the involvement of
its constituent members, the South African government has been able to participate in
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other multilateral initiatives that actively promote its concern to bring about peaceful
resolution  to  these  conflicts.  Though,  as  noted  above,  there  was  a  tendency  under
Mandela to pursue unilateral initiatives — for example this was most evident in the South
African action taken in support of the United Nations brokered talks in Lusaka to win
Savimbi's adherence — the general  opprobrium and/or failure of  these measures has
curbed this tendency under Mbeki20.
 
The Zimbabwean crisis and South Africa's «Quiet
Diplomacy»
19 The South African government's response to the crisis in Zimbabwe, like the evolution of
the crisis itself, has been one that has developed over time. Sources of influence upon the
South African response have been, first and foremost, the domestic environment and the
vulnerability  of  the  ANC  government  on  the  question  of  land  restitution  and
redistribution, something that domestic political parties have sought to exploit. Another
factor has been the regional states and the desire to maintain cohesion within SADC
during  this  period  of  multiple  crises  facing  the  organisation.  And,  finally,  the
international community and — especially seen through the media - its expectations of
South Africa have been a constant source of pressure.
 
The crisis
20 While  the  details  regarding  the  crisis  in  Zimbabwe  are  best  treated  elsewhere  it  is
important to provide a summary of the main issues that have brought the country to the
brink of  disaster  as  seen from the South African perspective21.  An influential  report
produced by the Africa Institute of South Africa, the result of a government-instigated
mission to Zimbabwe in early 2001, characterised the crisis in the following terms. In the
first instance, there is a crisis of legitimacy as a result of the erosion of the post-colonial
consensus built during the course of the liberation struggle. There is a crisis of expectations
coming  from  the  deteriorating  economic  situation  and  the  failure  of  structural
adjustment  measures  to  halt  the  erosion  of  social  and  economic  gains  of  the
independence period. And there is a crisis of confidence in the institutions of the state,
inspired by the actions of the security forces and intimidation of the judiciary22.
21 Underlying this set of intertwining crises was the colonial legacy of land distribution in
which 10 million hectares of the country's most viable land is owned by 4,500 mostly
white  commercial  farmers  and 18  million  hectares  is  owned by  about  850,000  black
farmers. The promised land distribution, which was predicated on the «willing buyer and
seller at market values» approach (adopted by South Africa after 1994) and had called for
162,000 families to be resettled on 8.3 million hectares under Phase One of the Land
Reform and Resettlement Programme, had resulted in only 71,000 families being resettled
on 3.5 million hectares of land by 1990. Since that time, various efforts to institutionalise
international support for an orderly approach to redistribution have failed. Concurrently,
the  implementation  of  a  structural  adjustment  programme  in  the  early  1990s,  in
conjunction with the difficulties experienced in competing in the emergent international
trading environment, resulted in a contraction of the economy by 8 per cent in 1993,
unemployment increasing to over 50 per cent, double-digit inflation (despite World Bank
predictions that it would drop) and a collapse in social services. Finally, with the ending
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of the Lancaster House constitution in 1990, various attempts have been made by Mugabe
to alter aspects of it so as to further entrench Zanu rule through the creation of a one-
party state or,  after that failed,  to severely circumscribe the role of other sectors or
power bases.
 
Assumptions informing South African foreign policy towards
Zimbabwe
22 When examining the content of South Africa's «quiet diplomacy», it is useful to identify
the assumptions and perceived constraints that have guided it. These were:
23 — South Africa's economy is too closely linked to Zimbabwe to impose sanctions;
24 — The ANC government is itself vulnerability on land question;
25 — South Africa has the necessary leverage over Zimbabwe in the areas of finance, oil and
electricity to affect changes in behaviour;
26 — The South African model of negotiated settlement based on compromise is transferable
to Zimbabwe;
27 — South Africa's regional hegemony requires a careful approach favouring persuasion
over confrontation and multilateralism over unilateralism.
28 An additional point, emphasised by Linda Freeman, is that both parties saw themselves as
inheriting the mantle of rule through the liberation struggle and, consequently, viewed
with suspicion any domestic opposition outside of that historical framework23. This belief
was more pronounced by Zanu than the ANC, and, within the ANC, more pronounced
amongst  the  exile  movement  than  those  coming  out  of  the  domestic  «charterist»
tradition that  characterised the United Democratic  Front.  While  these considerations
exercised influence over South African decision making towards the crisis in Zimbabwe,
the  foreign  policy  approach adopted  by  Pretoria  has  experienced an  evolution from
denial to constructive engagement and, in the wake of near collapse of law and order in
Zimbabwe in the run up to presidential elections, disillusionment.
 
The period of denial
29 While it was evident to some observers as early as 1997, when the war veterans rioted
upon discovering their  pensions had suddenly disappeared,  that  the problems facing
Zimbabwe were deeply structural in nature rather than a passing crisis, in most South
African  political  and  business  circles  there  was  every  expectation  that  Harare  in
conjunction with the international community would resolve these matters. The steady
trickle of illegal immigrants across the Limpopo, the economic difficulties experienced in
bi-lateral trade, the onset of strikes by public sector workers protesting against the fall in
their standard of living, the drying up of Zimbabwean-sourced investment capital and the
nascent political activism aimed against Zanu all could be seen in hindsight as warning
shots of a coming crisis.
30 However, it was the intervention in the Congo in August 1998 that transformed the South
African government's attitude with respect to Zimbabwe. This shift was fuelled, on the
one  hand,  by  the  recognition  that  military  intervention  in  the  name  of  SADC  by
Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia jeopardised the institutionalised nature and conduct of
the regional organisation given its uncertain basis of action and, on the other hand, was a
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direct challenge to South African aspirations to regional leadership. The hastily organised
and  poorly  implemented  joint  South  African-Botswanan  operation  in  defence  of
constitutional rule in Lesotho the following month, which arguably had a weaker SADC
mandate than the intervention in the Congo, was considered by many observers to be a
direct response to events in the Congo24. With SADC effectively split between two poles —
Zimbabwe,  Angola  and  Namibia  versus  South  Africa,  Botswana  and  Mozambique  —
Pretoria's ambitions for regional development and indeed its own role the continental
leader were called into question.
31 The convening of an international donor conference in Harare in September 1998 seemed
to offer a credible route to resolving Zimbabwe's land problem. Funding amounting to Z
$7.4 million was pledged to purchase 118 farms but the inception phase never happened
due to conditionalities  on transparency of  the process  imposed by donors.  However,
within a year the costs to the Zimbabwean economy of sustaining the Congo operation
had  become  apparent  and,  following  the  disclosure  of  irregularities  in  national
accounting to underplay these costs, brought about a suspension of IMF loans of US$193
million and US$140 million. At the same time, the European Union put its aid programme
under review following a confrontation with Zimbabwe over the Congo issue.
32 In the wake of continued economic hardship, opposition political forces began to coalesce
and in September 1999 the leader of the Zimbabwean Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU),
Morgan Tsvangirai, prominent trade union activists, and some white business interests
came together to form a new party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Open
discord within Zanu itself was increasingly voiced, especially after the economic costs of
the land invasions and the Congo intervention began to take their toll25. By October 2000,
with  the  installation  of  technocrat  Simba  Makoni  as  finance  minister  in  Mugabe
government,  a  concerted  effort  was  launched  to  halt  the  slide  through  currency
devaluation, reduction of bank rate, limitations on government borrowing and reduction
of state salaries. However, cabinet ministers anxious to bring the farm invasions to an end
found their actions continually blocked by Mugabe26.
 
The period of constructive engagement
33 Under these circumstances, isolating and acting against Mugabe, whose behaviour as a
rogue player within SADC has become increasingly obvious, has not seen by the Mbeki
administration  as  a  viable  option.  «Quiet  diplomacy»  became  the  watchword  for
Pretoria's chosen approach to the promotion of dialogue and persuasion in engaging the
Zimbabwean leadership. South Africa's trade and investment interests in Zimbabwe were
still substantial and, despite the cost to the rand and its own international reputation,
underscores the fact that Zimbabwe is South Africa's largest trading partner in Africa.
The  imposition  of  economic  sanctions  would  impose  high  costs  on  South  African
businesses operating in the country, in addition to incurring domestic political fallout
with uncertain consequences27. The very real fear that a seriously destabilised Zimbabwe
would ignite refugee flows and greater economic chaos across the region also stayed
Pretoria's hand and exercised influence over fellow SADC states who themselves were not
part of the triple intervention in the Congo. With the involvement of Angola and Namibia
in what amounted to a de facto alliance with Zimbabwe to support the Kabila regime in
Kinshasa, the threat to SADC unity is very real indeed. By adopting the «quiet diplomacy»
approach, Mbeki underscored the limitations of South Africa's willingness and ability to
South Africa’s «Quiet Diplomacy» and the crisis in Zimbabwe
Cadernos de Estudos Africanos, 2 | 2002
10
overtly challenge the non-interventionist norm in SADC while respecting, flawed though
the process was, that Mugabe and ZANU-PF were democratically elected.
34 The result was that through «quiet diplomacy» South Africa sought to ensure that the
Zimbabwean  economy  continued  to  function  through,  for  example,  extra-ordinary
extensions of credit in key sectors over which South African had control such as power. It
also undertook to serve as an intermediary between the Bretton Woods Institutions and
Harare,  giving  voice  to  the  concerns  of  the  Zimbabwean state  and  business.  This  is
especially the case in the volatile area of land reform that Mbeki personally sought to
resolve by seeking out  foreign financial  resources  to  pay for  the purchase and legal
transfer of white-owned farms. It sought to avoid any form of sanctions that would, it was
felt,  bring  about  a  full  economic  collapse  as  well  as  directly  damage  South  African
commercial interests in the process. At the same time, the South African government
entered into a number of discussions with Mugabe that, for the most part, sought to give
public assurances of support to him and the concerns over the land issue while suggesting
through private channels Pretoria's mounting concerns.
35 This new activist approach to the crisis commenced in earnest with the referendum on
the  Zimbabwean  constitution  in  February  2000.  The  Constitution  Commission's
liberalising  reforms  to  the  constitution,  which  had had  substantive  input  from civil
society,  were rejected by the government in early February 2000.  Mbeki  flew with a
delegation that included officials from the South African parastatal ESKOM, SASOL and
the Reserve Bank to meet with the government in Harare in advance of the referendum.
He was able to convince Mugabe to honour the results of the referendum, which the
Zimbabwean  president  apparently  believed  would  go  in  his  favour,  in  exchange  for
providing a continual flow of electrical power, oil delivery and promises of a US$133 mn
«economic rescue package»28. Contrary to expectations, 55.9% of Zimbabweans polled, the
majority of whom were based in the urban areas and were a bastion of anti-Mugabe
support, rejected a government sponsored referendum on constitutional reform. At this
juncture the notion of the efficacy of «quiet diplomacy» seemed to be confirmed for
officials  in  Pretoria  and  this  set  the  stage  for  their  continued  positive  expectations
towards this approach to the crisis.
36 Mbeki  put  the  strategy  to  work,  embarking  on  a  lightening  visit  to  Harare  in  the
immediate  aftermath  of  the  referendum  defeat,  to  discuss  the  outcome  and  the
forthcoming parliamentary elections in June. He hoped through bringing pressure to bear
upon  Mugabe  in  private,  while  indicating  support  for  his  government  publicly,  the
upcoming elections would be free and fair. Invasions of white owned farms began by self-
proclaimed  «war  veterans»  began  within a  month,  with  the  vocal  support  of  the
government (who stayed the hand of the police and, as subsequent events demonstrated,
were  intimately  involved  in  creating  the  «war  veterans»  movement)  and  violence
perpetrated by the war veterans against white and black Zimbabweans began to have a
delirious effect on both the Zimbabwean economy and those of its neighbours. A summit
meeting between Mugabe and the leaders of South Africa and Mozambique in April 2000
ended with Mbeki and Chissano proclaiming solidarity with the Zimbabwean leader, and
privately voicing their concerns. This public position was echoed again by Mbeki at the
Zimbabwean Trade Fair later that same year.
37 It  would  be  best  that  (the  land  question)  is  dealt  with  in  a  co-operative  and  non-
confrontational manner among all the people of this sister country, both black and white,
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reflecting  the  achievement  of  national  consensus  on  this  issue  encompassing  all
Zimbabweans29.
38 Alarm palpable within Zanu with the results of the parliamentary elections of June 2000
in which, despite intimidation and the death of over thirty MDC supporters, the MDC won
57  seats  to  Zanu's  62  seats.  Thereafter,  the  pace  of  land  invasions  increased  and,
concurrently,  Mugabe  began  to  take  aim  at  the  independent  judiciary  that  was
increasingly  seen  as  an  obstacle  to  realising  the  ambitions  to  «accelerated»  land
redistribution. As was to become evident in 2002, a decision was taken within Mugabe's
circle  that,  unlike  the  parliamentary  elections  (which  despite  the  violence that
accompanied the campaign, were for the most part conducted in a «free and fair» manner
on the polling day), the presidential elections of 2002 would not only be fought through
mobilisation of party activists, but that the electoral process itself would be subject to
manipulation in order to assure a positive result for Zanu.
39 On the broader front of SADC and its role in the security sector, since the rupture over
Mugabe's use of the suspended SADC Organ to support the Congo intervention, South
Africa has been quietly lobbying the other SADC members to consider restructuring this
anomalous situation. The SADC foreign ministers meeting in late 2000 announced that the
security sector would be included in the overall restructuring of the organisation and this
was confirmed at the Heads of State summit in Windhoek in March 200130.  In a clear
demonstration  that  the  South  African  government  understood  the  role  economic
incentives have played in sustaining the complicity of the Zimbabwean military in the
Congo intervention,  they  proposed  that  SADC undertake  to  develop  a  regional  arms
manufacturing  capacity  —  one  that  would  incorporate  the  Zimbabwean  Defence
Industries which have been key beneficiaries of the war in Congo — under the auspices of
a restructured Organ31. This is especially the case given the involvement of Angola and
Namibia in a de facto alliance with Zimbabwe to support the Kabila regime in Kinshasa.
Under the stewardship of Swaziland, SADC reconsidered the position of the chair of the
Organ and the terms which allowed it to be used to authorise intervention32. Faced with
concerted pressure from SADC, Mugabe finally agreed to relinquish his position in favour
of an arrangement that gave the outgoing, current and future chairs a role in August
2001.
40 Following the June 2000 elections and the spiralling violence that accompanied the land
occupations,  disquiet within South Africa «quiet diplomacy» began to assume a more
public stance as the political parties sought to gain from the perception of inaction and
even support for Mugabe's unlawful land acquisition policy. At the same time, the crisis
in Zimbabwe began to register within the South African political landscape. Democratic
Alliance leader, Tony Leon, became a persistent critic of the government's approach to
Zimbabwe  from the  right  while  the  Pan  Africanist  Congress  felt  the  ANC's  position
marked a  betrayal  the dire  circumstances  facing not only Zimbabwe's  landless  black
majority but within South Africa itself. Other voices within the country's foreign policy
community  urged  action  upon  the  government33.  Such  was  the  growing  domestic
sensitivity  of  the  issue  that  Mbeki  himself  responded  by  declaring  that  those  who
criticised the government's «quiet diplomacy» were to be suspected of racist sensibilities
34.
41 At the same time, pressure had begun to mount within South Africa's rural and urban
black communities for resolution to their own problem of landlessness. For its own part,
the PAC used the volatile issue to stir up support amongst the urban homeless through a
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«sale» of unoccupied public land in Johannesburg and a group of black tenant farmers
based in Mpumalanga province called upon Mugabe to come to South Africa to address
their concerns35. In Kwazulu-Natal, illegal land occupations mushroomed in areas such as
Mangete, bringing white farmers, black tenants and squatters, as well as local advocacy
groups, into direct confrontation. The demolition of squatter camps and provisions for
police and army protection of property under siege suggest that the ANC government was
more committed to supporting the position of the white owners than that of landless
blacks36.  A sign of the divisive nature of the issue within South Africa and even ANC
circles  was  Winnie  Madikizela-Mandela's  visit  in  April  2000  to  an  occupied  farm in
Zimbabwe as an unofficial act of solidarity with the self-styled «war veterans». At the
same time, Mugabe's call for black Africans in other SADC countries to launch their own
occupations  of  white-owned  farms  at  SADC  summit  in  Windhoek  in  2001  served  to
highlight the slow pace of resettlement programmes in South Africa and Namibia, raising
the spectre of Zimbabwe-inspired domestic strife within these states.
42 The final phase of constructive engagement saw South Africa engaging the issues around
the regional SADC setting, the continental forum of the OAU and internationally through
the Commonwealth and the United Nations. South African officials, following in the wake
of  the  UN's  Millennium  2000  Summit  in  New  York  when  Mbeki  committed  the
government  play  a  role  as  intermediary  role  between  the  international  financial
institutions and Zimbabwe at the behest of Kofi Annan, had secured agreement of IMF
support  for  a  financial  package  that  would  support  some  of  the  costs  of  a  land
redistribution programme envisaged at  the  1998 UNDP conference.  Britain itself  was
induced  to  pledge  US$57  million  towards  the  process  —  after failed  bilateral  talks
between Blair's government and Zimbabwean officials in London the previous year — but
again the agreement fell apart as Harare refused to be moved on the issue of «law and
order» and transparency. At the same time, the aspect of «quiet diplomacy» that had
drawn so much international and domestic criticism, South Africa's public support for
Mugabe, began to wane and South African officials became more cautiously outspoken.
For example,  at  a  press conference in November 2001,  Mbeki  acknowledged that the
violence occurring in the build-up to the presidential elections would affect more than
just perceptions, noting, «If you have elections which are not seen as legitimate by the people,
you will have a situation that will be worse than the present one»37.
43 A final effort to resolve the land question in advance of the presidential  elections.  A
meeting was held in Nigeria in September 2001 under the auspices of the Commonwealth
Ministerial Action Group seemed to herald an eleventh hour resolution to the problem of
garnering British financial support for land reform and its results were swiftly endorsed
by five  SADC presidents.  However,  the  land invasions  continued unabated and,  with
Mugabe's decree in November 2001 ordering 1000 farmers to leave their land within three
months, it was clear to all observers that the Abuja Agreement was dead.
 
The period of disillusionment
44 While  the  collapse  of  the  Abuja  Agreement  signalled  the  effective  end  of  «quiet
diplomacy», there had been a hardening of position within government circles in South
Africa for some time.  Growing pressure within ANC ranks to take action had been a
feature of the public debate since on the middle of 2000 and was seen both in the public
criticism and even resignation of some (white) ANC members of parliament and also in
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Mandela's  thinly  veiled  statements  on  the  subject.  The  ANC's  alliance  partners,  the
Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South African Communist Party, have
become  increasingly  vocal  in  their  criticism  of  spiral  of  violence  and  attacks  on
Zimbabwean trade unions and the media38. And while the South African government has
been  fairly  dismissive  of  reports  that  the  rand's  slippage  has  been  the  result  of
Zimbabwean instability, this and the continuing dearth of foreign direct investment were
credited  by  the  International  Investor  Forum-a  leading  group  of  financiers  brought
together at Mbeki's behest — to be behind the lacklustre response of investors towards
South Africa39. Finance Minister Trevor Manuel explicitly attacked the policy in August
2001  when he  stated  that  «Zimbabwe has  come off  the  rails».  The  SADC summit  in
Blantyre in August 2001 expressed concern of the effect it was having on the region. The
SADC Task Team, which grew out of the August summit, criticised Mugabe in October
2001  on  failure  to  reinstate law and  order.  Proponents  of  constructive  engagement,
within government fewer and fewer,  centred within the President's office and in the
person of Mbeki himself40.
45 The dilemma facing Mbeki in the aftermath of Abuja, whose defensiveness reached the
point of trying to characterise critics of South Africa's approach as racists in March 2001,
was what action to take in light of the failure of «quiet diplomacy». The rationale for
pursuing  constructive  engagement  had been both  one  of  potential  damage  to  South
Africa's economy and a belief in the country's leverage over Zimbabwe. While the former
was fast being realised the latter never seemed to materialise. Decision making on the
issue had been complicated by Mbeki's own administrative re-structuring of government
as well. Presiding over a centralisation of the instruments of foreign policy, through his
selection  of  a  weak  foreign  minister  and  bolstering  of  the  Office  of  the  Presidency,
coupled to a general  clearing out of seasoned personnel in the DFA and DTI without
providing for effective replacements, limited the role of appointed officials in setting and
implementing policy towards Zimbabwe41. Indeed, the deputy-minister of foreign affairs
complained that there was no one within the government services who could provide
effective analysis of the crisis42. Exacerbating all of this was Mbeki's personal predilection
for  sticking obstinately  to  a  publicly  stated view point,  seen most  infamously  in  his
dogged attachment to the HIV/AIDs dissident argument, which seemed again to have
eclipsed his sense of reason43.
46 The  response  to  the  faillure  of  «quiet  diplomacy»  was  to  give  consideration,  albeit
without straying too closely to a public admission of failure,  to a new approach that
focused on organising an exit strategy for Mugabe. This increasingly came to mean the
onset of a transitional government in which representatives from the Zanu and the MDC
participated, directly drawing from South Africa's own experience of transition. In this
context,  the launching of  «party-to-party» discussions was thought to be a means of
broaching the subject with those elements within Zanu that had been marginalised by
Mugabe. As Zanu veteran, Eddison Zvobgo, stated, «We have tainted what was a glorious
revolution,  reducing  it  to  some  agrarian  racist  enterprise  ...  we  must  clean  the  slate,  bury
everything that has divided us and begin again»44. There had been expectations that the party
congress in late 2000 would oversee the retirement of Mugabe but the president was able
to outmanoeuvre Zanu reformists. Concurrently, Morgan Tsvangirai's meeting with top
ANC officials in early 2001 was seen as a harbinger of this new South African approach to
the  crisis.  One  of  the  contributing  factors  to  the  government's  ambivalent  attitude
towards the MDC had been the perception that it was such a «broad church» that, should
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it win the election in 2002, it would not be able to reconcile its internal differences and
govern effectively45. An initiative to broaden the party-to-party discussions to the SADC
level, which resulted in trilateral meetings between the ANC, Zanu and Frelimo, proved
however to be ineffective as the rhetoric of the liberation struggle and the notions of
solidarity overtook any talk of criticism of events in Zimbabwe46.
47 In the meantime, the cost of the Zimbabwean crisis to South Africa's economy could no
longer be ignored by Pretoria. The battering of the rand, which had lost nearly 40 of its
value at one point in October 2001, the impact that this and the crisis in general had on
the carefully constructed macro-economic policy which sought to establish South Africa
as  a  preferred  destination  for  foreign  investors  and  the  onset  of  thousands  of
impoverished  Zimbabwean  refugees  illegally  crossing  the  border  to  escape  growing
hunger. The international community, which had been for so long urging South Africa to
take a more forthright position on the crisis, finally itself began to edge towards action.
On the eve of the presidential elections the EU, under the urgings of Britain and the
Scandinavian states, successfully passed a resolution applying targeted sanctions against
Mugabe and 19 of the top Zanu leadership. The reaction on the part of the South Africa
government was to shrilly deny that sanctions would have any effect upon the crisis.
«The  South  African  government  finds  it  regrettable  and  unfortunate  that  the
European Union chose to impose targeted sanctions ... We believe that sanctions
will not achieve the intended result. On the contrary, they may further compound
the situation»47.
48 The  United  States,  which  had  threatened  to  take  action  through  the  Zimbabwe
Democracy Act in 2000, finally passed the bill into law that echoed the EU's application of
«smart sanctions». While a few foreign policy pundits in South Africa urged for greater
action, on the whole in the run up to the presidential elections in Zimbabwe there seemed
to be a consensus that all reasonable avenues had been tried and that events would have
to run their course48. Finally, the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting (Chogm)
in Australia,  which highlighted the gap between the outlook of  the «ABC countries»
(Australia, Britain and Canada) and the African states, efforts by Tony Blair to secure a
condemnation of Mugabe and even discussion of suspension of Zimbabwe were thwarted
by the combined resistance of Africa's leaders. A compromise was struck whereby the
Australian prime minister and the presidents of Nigeria and South Africa would convene
a special meeting that would look to the Commonwealth Observer Mission's report of the
conduct of the elections before ruling on Zimbabwe's suspension.
49 However,  it  was  an  ambitious  initiative  that  sought  to  bring  together  the  leading
industrial countries in support of African development, the New African Partnership for
African Development (NEPAD), which was to ultimately exercise influence over the South
Africa position on Zimbabwe. Mbeki himself had devoted considerable diplomatic and
financial capital towards winning support in the North for NEPAD and, on the basis of a
series of bilateral meetings as well as interventions at the World Economic Forum, was
along with Obasanjo to address the G-8 meeting in June 2002 on the topic49. At the same
time,  the  British  prime  minister's  own  role  as  champion  of  African  interests  was
increasingly drawn into a consideration of the conduct of South African diplomacy on
Zimbabwe.  While  initial  indications  out  of  Downing Street  in  advance of  the  Chogm
meeting were that, as Baroness Amos declared in mid-February, that «it would be wrong
to see Zimbabwe as  a  test  case for  NEPAD»,  in the aftermath of  the Commonwealth
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meeting,  the British government  stated that  its  support  for  NEPAD might  indeed be
affected by events in Zimbabwe50.
50 The  Commonwealth  Observer  Group  issued  a  strong  condemnation  of  the  electoral
process  in  Zimbabwe on 12  March 2002,  though the  South African observer  mission
declared the election substantially «free and fair», in spite of considerable dissent within
the ranks of the 50 strong mission. SADC was divided, with the SADC parliamentary group
condemning  the  election  on  eight  points  and  the  SADC  Council  of  Ministers'  group
declaring the results to be legitimate51. A senior British official, speaking after the results
had been released, declared: «Tony Blair is sympathetic to NEPAD but if Mbeki rolls over on
Zimbabwe, British domestic opinion may leave him little room for manoeuvre»52. Washington was
blunter, with the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs saying that without South African
condemnation of the elections «NEPAD would be dead on arrival». The hostile response of
the  international  community  to  the  South  African  government's  position,  which
necessitated  a  retraction  of  a  piece  attributed  to  Mbeki  in  the  ANC  Today  online
publication which characterised the elections as legitimate, was a clear indication that
Mbeki's government was panicking. After failing to attend Mugabe's inauguration on 17
March, the South African and Nigerian presidents with Mugabe and Tsvangirai to discuss
the possibility of a government of national unity,  a suggestion that was treated with
ridicule by Zanu ministers and ruled out by the MDC leader. Meeting in London on 19
March,  Mbeki,  Obasanjo and Howard recommended that  the Commonwealth suspend
Zimbabwe for a year.
 
Assessing «Quiet Diplomacy»
51 An assessment of «quiet diplomacy» as conducted by South Africa demonstrates some
fundamental flaws or oversights in the approach and is suggestive of both naivety in
Pretoria and the limitations on South Africa's ability to act as a regional leader.
 
Misreading of Mugabe
52 There has been every expectation — both within moderate elements of Zanu and South
African government circles — that each crisis was issue-specific (the referendum, the
parliamentary  elections)  rather  than  systemic  (white  ownership  of  majority  of
agricultural land, the Bretton Woods Institutions' hold over the economy and Mugabe's
political status) and would therefore come to an end. After all, Mugabe had had a history
of using the land issue many times before to galvanise domestic support without ever
taking serious action against the farmers. It was not until April 2001 that members of the
government began to recognise that Mugabe was bent on using all means possible to
secure re-election in 2002 and that, like Milasovitch, would issue assurances to Pretoria as
a matter of short term expediency.
 
Misreading of South Africa's influence over Zimbabwe
53 The February 2000 experience around the referendum suggested that South Africa could
bargain with Mugabe through the application of incentives, in this case diplomatic in the
form of support and sympathetic utterances or in the economic support in the form of
credits in the energy sector and other areas. This situation, however, was not to repeat
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itself as Mugabe, on the one hand, sought out alternative sources of finance such as Libya
to fend off creditors for energy; and on the other hand, demonstrated a willingness to
allow the economy to slide into disarray if necessary to facilitate his pursuit of power.
The initial assumptions of leverage, which had been a central motivation in support of
pursuing a policy of constructive engagement, were transformed by the end of 2001 to a
recognition of having been both out-manoeuvred by Mugabe and an absence of leverage
over him.
 
Misreading of South Africa's influence over SADC
54 Multilateralism had  been  the  chosen  means  to  resolve  the  problem of  unilateralism
experienced by South Africa during the Nigerian crisis. However, at least in the SADC
context where Mugabe exercised considerable influence by dint of his past role in the
organisation, enduring ties of solidarity and self-interest amongst the leadership with its
own tenuous claims to legitimacy, the limitations of collective action were demonstrated.
Indeed,  the  Zimbabwean  crisis  and  the  difficulty  to  win  support  for  South  African
positions within that framework has introduced a distinct disillusionment within Pretoria
for the efficacy of multilateralism in the region53.
55 Beyond the particulars of «quiet diplomacy» and its failings, what this case tells us is that
South Africa's willingness and capacity to act as a regional hegemon is limited. Where the
South African government  has  chosen to  act,  and succeeded,  has  been in long term
restructuring of SADC, seen for instance in the process of wresting the Organ away from
Mugabe. But, the government's efforts to utilise what it perceived to be its influence over
Mugabe proved to be illusive and ultimately ineffectual. This suggests that — outside of
the  business  community  —  post-apartheid  South  Africa  may lack  the  pre-requisites
necessary to play the dominant role ascribe to it by McGowan and others.
56 Some may want to see «quiet diplomacy» as an effort to purse a foreign policy that was
more autonomous of the forces of international capital, deliberately ignoring the signals
and punitive measures sent through the markets. In this analysis, independent action is a
function of willingness to endure economic and political censure against a measuring of
the costs of doing so. When faced with the spectre of losing vital industrialised country
support  for  NEPAD,  Mbeki  chose  to  finally  abandon the  last  of  his  pretensions  to  a
«middle way» in dealing with Mugabe and adopted the position held by the G-7 countries.
57 Finally, this case study underlines the point that leadership matters. That is that the role
of  structural  and institutional  forces alone is  not sufficient to account for the policy
outcomes  pursued  by  Pretoria.  Mbeki's  preference  for  a  «softly,  softly»  approach,
contrasted with Mandela's forthright declaratory approach, as well as his centralisation
of  decision  making,  were  all  part  of  the  pacing  and  process  of  articulating  «quiet
diplomacy» as well as the international community's perception of it.
 
Conclusion
58 The arc of crisis across Southern Africa, in which Zimbabwe is but one of a number of
interlocking issues, highlights several challenges for the regional organisation that not
only  are  suggestive  of  the  divisions  within  the  region  but,  ironically,  are  also  an
expression of growing regional integration. Grappling with issues as diverse as human
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rights and democratisation promotion; the need to expand a market-oriented financial
and  trade  architecture;  and  the  position  on  state  sovereignty  and  interference  in
domestic affairs of member states, the SADC leadership must come to terms with this set
of fundamental concerns that will shape the organisation and its long term development.
Within the regional framework of crisis and change, South African leadership remains the
linchpin and — despite differences — it certainly is the society with which the West most
closely identifies54. South African assertiveness in regional affairs, when conducted in a
multilateral  setting  and  clearly  backed  by  the  international  community,  can  be  a
powerful  tool  to  promote peaceful  and democratic  outcomes in the Southern Africa.
However, and this is emphasised by Pretoria, to pursue foreign policy without reference
to the underlying economic and political realities of its own development and its wider
ambitions for SADC (as well as the continent) would be dangerously short sighted. In this
sense, the isolation and opprobrium in African circles which accompanied South Africa's
criticism of Nigeria in 1996 — a position applauded by a West itself unwilling to take
substantive action against Abacha — continues to cast a pall on South African action in
defence of human rights.
59 That the crisis in Zimbabwe puts the dilemma of South African aspirations for continental
leadership and its limitations - self-imposed or otherwise - in sharp relief is clear. By
adopting  the  preferred  «quiet  diplomacy»  approach  towards  Mugabe,  the  Mbeki
administration has underscored the limitations of South Africa's willingness and ability
to overtly challenge the norm of non-intervention in SADC and, by implication, Africa as
a whole. The international chorus for South African-led action against Mugabe's obvious
human rights violations is echoed amongst opposition figures within Zimbabwe itself,
where, in the words of one observer, «History will judge harshly those like Thabo Mbeki who
should  act  but  choose  to  feed  the  serpent»55.  And  yet  one  need  look  no  further  than
neighbouring Mozambique to see the enormous cost of pursuing an ideologically purist
foreign policy — implementing sanctions against Rhodesia in the 1970s and supporting
the ANC in the 1980s — to recognise that such an approach should only be embarked upon
with great trepidation. Balanced between its own history, development imperatives and
the desire to assume a leading role in continental affairs, the South African government
will continue to act like the frightened elephant in the fable, taking refuge in the fact that
despite its timidity it is bound to outlive the mouse. What condition the fragile ideals that
brought it and so many liberation movements to power across the region will be at that
point in remains to be seen.
NOTES
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ABSTRACTS
The Southern African Development Community (SADC), once perceived to be a potential bulwark
of solidarity on regional security and emerging democratic politics, is divided as never before.
Since the onset of regional intervention in the Congo (ex-Za1re) in 1998, the organisation of
fourteen member states has experienced unprecedented dissent and internal friction that has
paralysed its role as a regional peacemaker. With the voices of democracy, tolerance, and peace,
including  that  of  regional  giant  South  Africa,  increasingly  silenced  by  autocratic  leaders  in
Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, and the DC Congo, SADC has become ineffective in fostering security
in Southern Africa. Most puzzling for international observers is in this context the behaviour of
the continent's most celebrated democracy, South Africa, towards the crisis in Zimbabwe.
A Southern African Development Community (SADC), outrora vista como um potencial baluarte
de  solidariedade  para  a  protecção  da  segurança  regional  e  de  uma  política  democrática
emergente, esta hoje mais dividida que nunca. Desde o início, em 1998, da intervenção regional
no  Congo  (ex-Zaire),  esta  organização  composta  por  catorze  estados  membros  passa  por
dissensos e fricções internas sem precedente que a paralisaram na sua função de garantir a paz
na região. Enquanto as vozes da democracia, tolerância e paz — mesmo as do gigante regional, da
Africa do Sul — são cada vez mais silenciados pelos líderes autocráticos no Zimbabwe, em Angola,
na  Namíbia  e  na  RD  Congo,  a  SADC  se  tornou  num  instrumento  ineficaz  para  promover  a
segurança  na  Africa  Austral.  Neste  contexto,  o  comportamento  mais  desconcertante  e  o  da
democracia mais célebre do continente, a da África do Sul, face a crise no Zimbabwe.
La Southern African Development Community (SADC), autrefois vue comme un mécanisme de
défense  solidaire  de  la  sécurité  régionale  et  d'une  politique  démocratique  émergente,  est
aujourd'hui plus divisée que jamais. Dès le début, en 1998, de l'intervention régionale au Congo
(ex-Zaïre), cette organisation composée de quatorze états membres passe par des dissensions et
frictions internes sans précédents qui la paralysent dans sa fonction de garantir la paix dans la
région. Or que les voix de la démocratie, de la tolérance et de la paix — même celle du géant
régional, l'Afrique du Sud — sont de plus en plus réduits au silence par les leaders autoritaires du
Zimbabwe,  de l'Angola,  da la Namibie et  de la  RD Congo,  la  SADC est  devenu un instrument
inefficace pour promouvoir a sécurité en Afrique Australe. Dans ce contexte, le comportement le
plus déconcertant est celui de la démocratie la plus célèbre du continent, celle de l'Afrique du
Sud, par rapport à la crise au Zimbabwe.
INDEX
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